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Background: During the very early stage of the 2009 pandemic, mass
chemoprophylaxis was implemented as part of containment measure. The purposes
of the present study were to systematically review the retrospective studies that
investigated the effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis during the 2009 pandemic, and
to explicitly estimate the effectiveness by employing a mathematical model.
Methods: A systematic review identified 17 articles that clearly defined the cases
and identified exposed individuals based on contact tracing. Analysing a specific
school-driven outbreak, we estimated the effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis using
a renewal equation model. Other parameters, including the reproduction number
and the effectiveness of antiviral treatment and school closure, were jointly
estimated.
Results: Based on the systematic review, median secondary infection risks (SIRs)
among exposed individuals with and without prophylaxis were estimated at 2.1%
(quartile: 0, 12.2) and 16.6% (quartile: 8.4, 32.4), respectively. A very high
heterogeneity in the SIR was identified with an estimated I2 statistic at 71.8%. From
the outbreak data in Madagascar, the effectiveness of mass chemoprophylaxis in
reducing secondary transmissions was estimated to range from 92.8% to 95.4%
according to different model assumptions and likelihood functions, not varying
substantially as compared to other parameters.
Conclusions: Only based on the meta-analysis of retrospective studies with different
study designs and exposure settings, it was not feasible to estimate the effectiveness
of antiviral prophylaxis in reducing transmission. However, modelling analysis of a
single outbreak successfully yielded an estimate of the effectiveness that appeared to
be robust to model assumptions. Future studies should fill the data gap that has
existed in observational studies and allow mathematical models to be used for the
analysis of meta-data.Background
In April 2009, a pandemic caused by the influenza A (H1N1-2009) virus (pH1N1) was
recognized, spreading rapidly across the world [1]. The virulence of pH1N1 infection
appeared to be likely lower than those of other pandemics during the 20th century [2],
but the population impact was not negligible as a whole [3]. To strengthen prepared-
ness against future pandemics better with plentiful supports of scientific evidence, it is© 2013 Mizumoto et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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lyse the epidemiological dataset [4]. In particular, the effectiveness of containment
measure, including contact tracing, case isolation, antiviral prophylaxis, school closure
and other radical and resource-consuming countermeasures should be assessed by
using the empirical data. This can only be achieved by experiencing an actual pan-
demic. The datasets from the 2009 pandemic are thus deemed the most valuable source
for epidemiological investigations which include an explicit analysis using mathematical
and statistical modelling techniques.
Among various public health measures, the present study focuses on the effectiveness
of antiviral prophylaxis as part of the containment measure. In the very early stage of
the 2009 pandemic, mass chemoprophylaxis was implemented to strictly prevent sec-
ondary transmission among close contacts of confirmed cases [5,6]. Since the retro-
spective epidemiological studies of chemoprophylaxis, commonly coupled with contact
tracing, took place across the world, we are granted a precious opportunity to empiric-
ally assess the effectiveness of these countermeasures in combination. To date, a num-
ber of original studies and systematic reviews have been published on the effectiveness
of antiviral prophylaxis against pH1N1, including a study that analysed empirical data-
sets of pH1N1 in a confined household setting [7]. However, a systematic review has
been only partially focused on pH1N1 [8] with a restriction to randomized controlled
trials that recruited participants based on some specified definition of “contact”. The
estimated effectiveness of prophylaxis derived from such studies has not been directly
applicable to other population settings (e.g. not generally applicable to any other con-
tacts) and thus to the associated policymaking. Moreover, a few original studies have
rested on very rigorous contact tracing, and the finding has been specific to that par-
ticular population (e.g. military conscripts in Singapore [9-11]). Thus, again it is diffi-
cult to apply the finding to other practical settings. Similar observational studies have
been hardly published.
Given that the effectiveness of chemoprophylaxis at a population level has yet to
be explicitly assessed, systematically reviewing and analysing published retrospective
observational studies would be a great asset to consider and plan for future contin-
gency planning that involves antiviral prophylaxis. The objectives of the present
study are two folds. First, we aim to systematically review the effectiveness of che-
moprophylaxis during the course of the 2009 pandemic. Because the effectiveness
of chemoprophylaxis in reducing the risk of secondary transmission cannot be sep-
arately estimated from that of contact tracing based on retrospective studies, we
estimate the effectiveness of the combined two countermeasures. Second, we aim
to explicitly estimate the effectiveness of chemoprophylaxis coupled with contact
tracing by employing a mathematical modelling technique, focusing on a single epi-
demic record of a school-driven outbreak.Methods
The present study consists of two major analytic steps, i.e. (i) a systematic review of lit-
erature and (ii) mathematical modelling of an outbreak data. As for the former, this sys-
tematic review was conducted in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement [12].
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Studies containing data on post exposure chemoprophylaxis against pH1N1 were re-
trieved from the Medline (PubMed) and Web of Science electronic databases on 2
October 2012. We used the following free text search terms in ‘All fields’:
#1: ‘influenza’ OR ‘flu’ OR ‘H1N1*’ OR ‘pH1N1’ OR ‘nH1N1’ OR ‘vH1N1’
#2: ‘pandemic’
#3: ‘prophylaxis’ OR ‘chemophylolaxis’
#4: ‘antiviral’ OR ‘oseltamivir’ OR ‘zanamivir’ OR ‘neuraminidase’
#5: #1 AND #2 AND #3 AND #4
The search was limited to studies published on or after 20 April 2009, i.e. subsequent
to the declaration of emergence of pH1N1 through 2 October 2012.Study selection
All titles identified by the search strategy were independently screened by two authors
(K.M. and H.N.). Abstracts of potentially relevant titles were then reviewed for eligibil-
ity, and selected articles were selected for closer examination if any description of either
a complete antiviral chemoprophylaxis or contact tracing was given. The duration of
“complete” prophylaxis was defined as those lasting for 7 days or longer. In addition,
eligible articles must define the “cases” explicitly and identify exposed individuals based
on contact tracing (e.g. based on sharing household or any other opportunities of close
contact).Ascertainment of secondary cases
Secondary infection risks (SIRs) were calculated as the proportion of identified sec-
ondary cases divided by the total number of contacts. It should be noted that the
crude calculation of SIRs as an overall conditional risk of infection given exposure
involves the following assumptions: (i) all the contacts are equally susceptible, and
(ii) the SIR is a conditional risk given exposure to the index case(s), and is exam-
ined for a reasonable length of time following an illness onset in the index case.
Depending on the case definition, SIRs can take different values due to differential
efficiency in identifying pH1N1 infection, e.g. by virologic testing, serologic evi-
dence of infection, a rapid detection testing (RDT) result, or by syndromic defin-
ition such as influenza-like illness (ILI) symptoms and acute respiratory infection
(ARI). Laboratory methods to confirm pH1N1 infections included the reverse tran-
scription PCR (RT-PCR) or viral culture on specimens collected from the respira-
tory tract. Serologic methods included an analysis of paired serological specimens
by hemagglutination inhibition or microneutralization assays, with a 4-fold or grea-
ter rise between baseline and convalescent period conventionally used to indicate
an infection. ILI was frequently defined as the presence of fever plus cough or sore
throat, i.e., a common surveillance definition of the influenza-like illness. Some stu-
dies also reported the occurrence of ARI among contacts where ARI was defined
as febrile or afebrile upper respiratory tract infection, commonly in the presence of
two or more influenza-related signs or symptoms.
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The primary data extracted were the total numbers of contacts and secondary cases per
single primary case with prophylaxis, which were commonly compared against the
same data among contacts without prophylaxis. If reported, the information with re-
spect to the number of primary cases with incomplete prophylaxis or who dropped out
from the prophylaxis was extracted. Other than these aspects, we extracted the infor-
mation concerning the ascertainment of secondary cases, the specific outbreak setting
(e.g. household or school), the antiviral agents that have been used for prophylaxis, the
durations of prophylaxis and other countermeasures, the time from illness onset to
starting prophylaxis, containment measures other than contact tracing and chemo-
prophylaxis, any indication of drug resistance (e.g. report of H275Y mutant), and the
numbers of cases with pneumonia and deaths. All the datasets were summarized in a
standardized form.
Statistical analysis of reviewed SIRs
SIRs were stratified according to the presence and absence of prophylaxis. Statistical
heterogeneity was assessed by I2 statistic which represents the extent of the degree of
variation. All statistical data were analysed using a statistical software JMP version 9.0.0
(SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA).
Modelling method
As a second part of the study, a mathematical model was employed to analyse an
outbreak data. We focus on a school-driven outbreak record in Madagascar [13] in
which the individual data of the date of illness onset as well as the time periods of
mass chemoprophylaxis and school closure have been reported. Because the daily
incidence was given, we describe the epidemic dynamics by employing a discrete-
time renewal equation model. Let the expected incidence (i.e. the number of new





where As describes the rate of secondary transmission per single primary case at
infection-age s (i.e., the time since infection) [14,15]. The linear model is employed,
because the outbreak occurred in a confined setting and it is unclear if the deple-
tion of susceptible individuals played a role. Thus, as a default assumption, we as-
sume that As is decomposed as
As ¼ Rgs; ð2Þ
where R is the reproduction number, representing the average number of secondary
cases generated by a single primary case, and gs is the probability mass function of
the generation time, i.e. the time from infection in a primary case to infection in
the secondary case caused by the primary case (see [16] for the details of discret-
isation). Based on a published statistical study [16], the generation time is assumed
to be known and is a discrete function that is derived from the continuous gamma
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Subsequently, we consider three realistic features of the data-generating process.
First, the outbreak investigation study classified the cases into confirmed and non-
confirmed cases [13], denoted by c1t and c0t, respectively. While all confirmed cases
received antiviral treatment upon diagnosis, non-confirmed cases were not subject to
treatment. Supposing that the relative risk of secondary transmission among those with
antiviral treatment compared to those without is expressed by a factor (1-εT) (i.e. εT is
the effectiveness of antiviral treatment in reducing secondary transmissions), the re-
newal equation should be rewritten as
c1t þ c0t ¼ 1 εTð ÞR
X1
s¼1 gsc1ts þ R
X1
s¼1 gsc0ts; ð4Þ
Second, exposed individuals undertook mass chemoprophylaxis with oseltamivir, 75
mg once a day, for 10 days starting from 12 October 2009. Third, the entire school was
closed from 16 October until 1 November 2009 to prevent further transmissions at the
school. Let δP and δS represent the relative risks of secondary transmission under mass
chemoprophylaxis and school closure, respectively. These are dealt with as delta func-
tions, i.e.,
δP ¼ 1; for t < τ0 and t > τ11 εP; for τ0≤ t ≤τ1 ð5Þ

and
δS ¼ 1; for t < υ0 and t > υ11 εS; for υ0 ≤ t ≤υ1 ð6Þ

where τ0 and τ1 represent the first and last days of antiviral prophylaxis, respectively.
Similarly, υ0 and υ1 represent the first and last days of school closure, respectively.
Parameters εP and εS are the effectiveness of chemoprophylaxis and school closure, re-
spectively. The renewal equation should be updated as







in which we denote the history of the series of cases up to day t by Ht, and we use the
conditional expectation on the left-hand side for the sake of later statistical inference. It
should be noted that R in (7) is interpreted as the reproduction number in the absence
of countermeasures including the chemoprophylaxis, school closure and antiviral treat-
ment. Since the equation (7) describes only the linear dynamics, we also considered an
alternative model that explicitly accounts for the depletion of susceptible individuals.
The conditional expectation for the alternative model reads







where st represents the fraction of susceptible individuals in the beginning of day t,
which was calculated using the observed data, i.e.,






where Mt scales the total number of boarders in the beginning of day t (i.e. used for
scaling the cumulative incidence).
Using the Madagascar data, we estimate four parameters, i.e., R, εT, εP and εS through
a likelihood-based approach. We employ three conditional likelihood functions to esti-
mate the parameters under two different scenarios (i.e. one scenario with the depletion
of susceptibles and the other without). As the first likelihood, the infection process is
assumed as sufficiently characterized by Poisson process ignoring individual heterogen-
eity [16]. Given observed data from time 0 up to tf with the total daily number of new
cases (i.e., the sum of confirmed and non-confirmed cases) denoted by Nt up to day t,
the likelihood function is written as
L R; εT ; εP; εS;Ht1ð Þ ¼
Ytf
t¼1
exp E c1t þ c0t ;Ht1ð Þ½ E c1t þ c0t;Ht1ð ÞNt
Nt!
: ð10Þ
Second, an alternative likelihood function is to assume that the incidence is geomet-
rically distributed, which is known to be the case for an exponentially distributed gen-
eration time [17].




E c1t þ c0t ;Ht1ð Þ þ 1 1
1




Third, if we incorporate a gamma distributed individual heterogeneity for describingthe infection process [16], the incidence follows a negative binomial distribution, i.e.,




Γ Nt þ kð Þ
Γ kð ÞNt !
k
k þ E c1t þ c0t ;Ht1ð Þ
 k E c1t þ c0t ;Ht1ð Þ




where k is the dispersion parameter that was estimated jointly with other parameters.
Both Poisson and geometric distributions are the special cases of this negative binomial
distribution with k→∞ and k→ 0, respectively. Maximum likelihood estimates of the
parameters were obtained by minimizing the negative logarithm of the likelihood func-
tion (10), (11) or (12). The 95% confidence interval (CI) was computed by using the




Of the 720 titles that were initially identified, 366 abstracts were accessed for eligibility,
of which 295 were excluded, and 71 full length articles were assessed for eligibility
(Figure 1). Of these, 17 studies were determined to be eligible and included in this sys-
tematic review [6,18-33]. Of the excluded 54 full length reports, 48 articles did not in-
clude the information of either prophylaxis or contact, 5 articles did not permit us to
Figure 1 Flow diagram of study selection.
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complete prophylaxis, and 1 study was on a seasonal A/H1N1. We thus excluded these
articles from the following review.
Tables 1, 2, 3 summarize 17 studies that have been included in our review. There was
a variety of the definitions of contact, including an arbitrary definition based only on
sharing a confined space or an artificial one for the sake of practicalities to disseminate
prophylactic medications among all potentially exposed individuals. In the household
setting, household contacts tended to be defined as any person who had stayed over-
night at least 1 night in the household within 1 day before or 7 days after symptom
onset in an index case. In other study settings such as military camp and hospital ward,
the definition was broader than household studies, including any person who shared
the same space and time with the index case and had a possibility to have been exposed
to the index case. Of the 17 studies (which actually covered 19 outbreaks, because one
study reported three different outbreaks), 8 (42.1%) reported outbreaks in hospital
ward, 9 (47.3%) reported household outbreaks, and 4 (21.1%) outbreaks were school-
driven, including those arising from primary school, secondary school and high school
(Table 1).
With respect to index case ascertainment (Table 1), RT-PCR was used in 15 out-
breaks (78.9%), ILI was adopted in 4 (21.1%) and RDT was used in 2 outbreaks (10.5%),
respectively. The numbers of index cases and traced contacts were reported in 16 of 19
(84.2%) and 19 of 19 outbreaks (100%), respectively. The median numbers of index
cases and contacts per study were 10.0 (quartile: 1.0, 56.8) and 50.0 (quartile: 13.0,
266.0), respectively. The median number of contacts per index case was calculated at
3.4 (quartile: 1.2, 44.6). As for prophylaxis, 17 outbreaks (89.5%) employed oseltamivir
alone. Of the total of 19 outbreaks, 5 (26.3%) outbreaks reported that the duration of
prophylaxis was set at 10 days for oseltamivir alone and 7–10 days for a combination
of oseltamivir and zanamivir. The different regimens of 9–10 days and 14 days for osel-
tamivir alone were adopted in 1 (5.3%) outbreak for each.
Secondary infection risk and prophylaxis
Median SIRs among exposed individuals with and without prophylaxis were estimated
at 2.1% (quartile: 0, 12.2) and 16.6% (quartile: 8.4, 32.4), respectively (Table 2). I2 statistic
Table 1 Studies on contact tracing and antiviral prophylaxis against influenza A (H1N1-2009) included in the systematic review
Authors Country Year Outbreak Setting Index case
ascertainment
No. index cases No. subjects traced Postexposure prophylaxis Dose and
duration
Baz et al. [18] Canada 2009 Household RT-PCR 1 4 oseltamivir 10 days
Calatayud et al. [19] United Kingdom 2009 School RT-PCR 23 2042 oseltamivir N/A
CDC [20] Colorado, USA 2009 Long Term Care Facilities ILI 21 43 oseltamivir N/A
CDC [20] Maine, USA 2009 Long Term Care Facilities ILI/RT-PCR 9 284 oseltamivir 14 days
CDC [20] New York City, USA 2009 Long Term Care Facilities RT-PCR 1 983 oseltamivir N/A
Fallo et al. [21] Argentina. 2009 Household RT-PCR 92 266 oseltamivir N/A
France et al. [22] USA 2009 School (High School)/
Household
ILI/RT-PCR 222 50 oseltamivir (n = 46),
zanamivir (n = 4)
N/A
Iioka et al. [23] Japan 2010 Hospital ward RDT 1 49 oseltamivir N/A
Jackson et al. [24] USA 2009 Household RT-PCR/Serology 32 9.7† oseltamivir N/A
Komiya et al. [6] Japan 2009 Household RT-PCR 124 333 oseltamivir (n = 232),
zanamivir (n = 63) &
others (n = 38)
7–10 days
Kute et al. [25] India 2010 Hospital ward RT-PCR 1 1 oseltamivir 10 days
Leung et al. [26] Hong Kong 2009 School (Secondary school)/
Household
RT-PCR 65 64 oseltamivir N/A
Lisena et al. [27] Italy 2009 Household RT-PCR 1 5 oseltamivir 10 days
Maltezou et al. [28] Greece 2011 Hospital ward N/A N/A 13 oseltamivir 10 days
Morgan et al. [29] USA 2009 Household RT-PCR N/A 92 oseltamivir N/A
Pannaraj et al. [30] USA 2009 Hospital ward ILI/RDT/RT-PCR 11 21 oseltamivir 9–10 days
Tsagris et al. [31] Greece 2011 Hospital ward RT-PCR 2 20 oseltamivir 10 days
van Gemert et al. [32] Australia 2009 Household RT-PCR N/A 57 oseltamivir N/A
Weston et al. [33] Australia 2009 School (Primary School) Not specified 1 83 oseltamivir N/A
Year, year of study; RDT, rapid diagnostic testing; ILI, influenza-like illness (fever plus cough or sore throat); RT-PCR, reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction; N/A, not available; †weighted number, i.e., the figure





















Table 2 Secondary infection risks (SIR) during contact tracing and chemoprophylaxis against influenza A (H1N1-2009)














Baz et al. [18] 15, 18, 50 and 59 y/o 4 1 25.0 (0, 67.4) 0 0 NC RT-PCR
Calatayud et al. [19] N/A 2042 0 0 N/A N/A N/A RT-PCR
CDC [20] N/A 43 0 0 N/A N/A N/A ILI
CDC [20] N/A 284 6 2.1 (0.4, 3.8) 16 0 0 ILI
CDC [20] N/A 983 176 17.9 (15.5, 20.3) N/A N/A N/A ILI
Fallo et al. [21] N/A 266 29 10.9 (7.2, 14.7) 31 12 38.7 (21.6, 55.9) ARI/ILI
France et al. [22] Median 45 y/o
(range: 0–91 y/o)
50 2 4.0 (0, 9.4) 651 76 11.7 (9.2, 14.1) ILI
Iioka et al. [23] N/A 49 6 12.2 (3.1, 21.4) 0 0 NC RDT/RT-PCR
Jackson et al. [24] N/A 9.7† 3.6† 37.1 (6.7, 67.5) 69.3† 11.5† 16.6 (7.8, 25.4) Serology
Komiya et al. [6] Median 43 y/o
(quartiles: 0–82)
333 2 0.6 (0, 1.4) 46 12 26.1 (13.4, 38.8) RT-PCR
Kute et al. [25] 40 y/o 1 0 0 0 0 NC ILI
Leung et al. [26] N/A 64 0 0 141 12 8.5 (3.9, 13.1) RT-PCR
Lisena et al. [27] Not specified 5 0 0 1 1 100 (NC) RT-PCR
Maltezou et al. [28] Median 11 days
(0–27 days)
13 0 0 0 0 NC ILI
Morgan et al. [29] N/A 92 18 19.6 (11.5, 27.7) 143 12 8.4 (3.8, 12.9) ARI/ILI/RT-PCR
Pannaraj et al. [30] 2–343 d/o 21 0 0 0 0 NC ILI
Tsagris et al. [31] Below 1 y/o 20 1 5.0 (0, 14.6) 0 0 NC RT-PCR
van Gemert et al. [32] 1–74 y/o 57 1 1.8 (0, 5.2) 65 17 26.2 (15.5, 36.8) ILI
Weston et al. [33] N/A 83 2 2.4 (0, 5.7) 0 0 NC Non Specified
95% CI, 95 percent confidence interval; RDT, rapid diagnostic testing; ILI, influenza-like illness (fever plus cough or sore throat); RT-PCR, reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction; N/A, not available; NC, not





















Table 3 Secondary infection risks (SIR) of influenza A (H1N1-2009) in relation to the timing of prophylaxis, containment measures and other factors
Authors SIR % (95% CI)
with prophylaxis
Time to start prophylaxis Containment measures other than






Baz et al. [18] 25.0 (0, 67.4) 0–2 days N/A Yes N/A N/A
Calatayud et al. [19] 0 0–10 days School closure No N/A N/A
CDC [20] 0 0–4 days Movement to care unit No 0 0
CDC [20] 2.1 (0.4, 3.8) N/A Movement restriction, Facility closure to
new admission and visitors
No N/A N/A
CDC [20] 17.9 (15.5, 20.3) within 24 hours Restriction of visiting No N/A N/A
Fallo et al. [21] 10.9 (7.2, 14.7) N/A N/A No N/A N/A
France et al. [22] 4.0 (0, 9.4) N/A N/A No N/A N/A
Iioka et al. [23] 12.2 (3.1, 21.4) immediately after illness
onset in index case
Refusal of new admission,
Entry restriction
Yes 3 (50%) 3 (50%)
Jackson et al. [24] 37.1 (6.7, 67.5) N/A N/A No N/A N/A
Komiya et al. [6] 0.6 (0, 1.4) median 2 days (quartiles: 0–7) Staying at home Yes N/A N/A
Kute et al. [25] 0 N/A N/A No 0 0
Leung et al. [26] 0 N/A School closure No 0 0
Lisena et al. [27] 0 1–2 days N/A No 0 0
Maltezou et al. [28] 0 N/A N/A No 0 0
Morgan et al. [29] 19.6 (11.5, 27.7) N/A N/A No N/A N/A
Pannaraj et al. [30] 0 N/A N/A No 0 0
Tsagris et al. [31] 5.0 (0, 14.5) N/A N/A No 1 (100%) 0 (0%)
van Gemert et al. [32] 1.8 (0, 5.2) median 6 days Separation and restriction of movement
in their homes
No N/A N/A
Weston et al. [33] 2.4 (0, 5.7) 1–2 days Quarantine No N/A N/A
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both of those with and without prophylaxis. Employing a paired t-test with n = 8, the SIR
among prophylaxis group appeared to be only marginally significantly smaller than that
among the control group (p = 0.052). In two studies, the SIRs among those without
prophylaxis were smaller than the SIRs among those with prophylaxis, and the underlying
reason for this finding was not manually identifiable. SIR among those who undertook
prophylaxis was not significantly associated with the number of traced contacts (p = 0.75,
a linear regression). Combining the outbreak setting information in Table 1 with those in
Table 2, we found that median SIR with prophylaxis at school setting was 1.2% (quartile:
0, 3.6), being smaller than that at non-school settings with 2.1% (quartile: 0, 17.9) (Welch
ANOVA, p = 0.03). Outbreaks occurring in households did not yield significantly higher
SIR than other settings (p = 0.12, t-test). When we stratify the SIR by ascertainment
method (i.e. syndromic or laboratory diagnosis), median SIR with prophylaxis ascertained
by ILI was 1.9% (quartile: 0, 12.7), which was slightly smaller than those based on RT-PCR
with the median SIR of 2.4% (quartile: 0, 18.6). No significant association was identified
between SIR and the ascertainment method (p = 0.50, t-test).
The median length of delay from exposure to prophylaxis was 1.5 days (quartile: 0.8,
2.5), which was not associated with SIR (p = 0.14, linear regression; Table 3). Median SIR
in outbreaks with clearly documented additional countermeasures (e.g. school closure)
was 1.8% (quartile: 0, 7.3) which was smaller than other studies with median SIR of 4.5%
(quartile: 0, 20.9). However, the difference was not significantly different (p = 0.21, t-test).
Outbreaks with a report of mutation marker of resistance yielded greater SIR (median
12.2% (quartile: 0.6, 25.0)) as compared to those without any report of resistance (median
1.9% (quartile: 0, 9.4)), but the difference was not significant (p = 0.47, t-test). A total of
eight studies explicitly documented the numbers of cases with pneumonia and fatal out-
come (Table 3). Of these, 1 study reported three deaths due to pneumonia and another
study reported one pneumonia case who had eventually recovered.Description of the outbreak in Madagascar
Figure 2 shows an epidemic curve of a school-driven outbreak of pH1N1 among board-
ing pupils in Madagascar from 6 October to 2 November 2009. Daily number of new
symptomatic cases is shown by the date of illness onset, classified by confirmatory diag-
nosis status. There were 59 cases who exhibited at least one symptom of influenza-like
illness (i.e., fever, cough or sneezing) among a total of 132 boarders. Confirmatory diag-
nosis was made by real-time RT-PCR. Of the 59 cases, 20 cases (33.9%) were confirmed
and 36 cases (61.0%) were non-confirmed in Figure 2. There were other 3 non-
confirmed cases (5.1%) who were excluded from Figure 2 and from our modelling ana-
lysis due to untraced characters including unknown dates of illness onset. Confirmed
cases received antiviral treatment upon diagnosis, while others did not undertake anti-
viral treatment.Modelling results
Figure 3A compares the observed and predicted incidence of pH1N1 outbreak in
Madagascar. Overall, our simplistic model captured the qualitative pattern of the temporal
dynamics (i.e. incidence) well. Fitting two different types of models with and without
Figure 2 Epidemic curve of a school-driven outbreak of influenza A (H1N1-2009) in Madagascar.
Daily number of symptomatic cases is shown, depending on confirmatory diagnosis status [13]. Confirmed
cases were diagnosed by means of RT-PCR, while others were diagnosed by contact plus influenza-like
illness, partially with swab samples. Chemoprophylaxis with oseltamivir was conducted for 10 days from
12 October 2009. School closure was implemented from 16 October 2009.
Figure 3 Epidemic dynamics of influenza A (H1N1-2009) in a primary school, Madagascar.
A. A comparison of the observed daily incidence (dots) against conditional expected values with and
without accounting for the depletion of susceptible individuals (solid and dashed lines, respectively). Day 0
represents 6 October 2009 onwards. B. Maximum likelihood estimate (solid line) and the 95% confidence
intervals (dotted lines) of the effective reproduction number without accounting for interventions. We
assumed that the number of cases on each day was sufficiently characterized by Poisson distribution. The
estimates of the effective reproduction number reflect the time-dependent reduction in the transmissibility
due to depletion of susceptible individuals only. Horizontal dashed line represents the threshold level of
R = 1 above which it implies that the epidemic can continue without public health interventions.
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http://www.tbiomed.com/content/10/1/4accounting for the depletion of susceptibles, we did not find an apparent difference in the
fitting results (Figure 3A and Table 4).
Table 4 summarizes the parameter estimates of the proposed model and the effective-
ness of prophylaxis, treatment and school closure. The effectiveness of mass chemo-
prophylaxis ranged from 92.8% to 95.4% according to different model assumptions and
likelihood functions. The estimated high values should be cautiously interpreted as they
do not only represent the effect of antiviral prophylaxis but also many other factors
that could arise from rigorous contact tracing. The estimated effectiveness of antiviral
prophylaxis was less sensitive to the incorporation of the depletion of susceptible indi-
viduals and the choice of likelihood function, especially when it was compared with the
sensitivities of other parameters including the reproduction number (the MLE ranging
from 4.8 to 7.4), the effectiveness of antiviral treatment (the MLE from 4.4% to 26.1%)
and the effectiveness of school closure (the MLE ranging from 10.0% to 48.0%). In
other words, Table 4 suggests that the effectiveness of chemoprophylaxis coupled with
contact tracing that is greater than 92% is a robust finding. With regard to the model
fit, the simplest type, i.e., a Poisson distributed likelihood without depletion of suscepti-
bles, yielded the minimum AIC value (35.0).
Figure 3B shows the estimate of the effective reproduction number along with the
95% confidence interval based on a model that explicitly accounted for the depletion of
susceptible individuals. Here the effective reproduction number represents the average
number of secondary cases per primary case at calendar time t in the absence of any
interventions. Both the expected value and the lower 95% confidence limit were con-
tinuously above unity, indicating that the outbreak could have lasted for a longer time
if no intervention took place. In other words, the outbreak was likely to have declined
to extinction due to concerted interventions.Discussion
The present study explored published literature on antiviral prophylaxis and contact
tracing against pH1N1, aiming to systematically investigate the published data andTable 4 Estimates for the parameters governing the transmission dynamics of influenza























Poisson Yes 4.8 (1.8, 9.6) 14.1 (0, 72.1) 94.3 (87.6, 97.7) 31.6 (0, 76.8) 37.9
Poisson No 6.0 (2.2,12.2) 4.4 (0, 68.2) 93.3 (85.6, 97.3) 10.0 (0, 69.5) 35.0
Geometric Yes 6.6 (1.5, NC) 26.1 (0, NC) 94.1 (71.8, 98.7) 40.6 (0, NC) 39.7
Geometric No 7.4 (1.6, NC) 12.8 (NC, NC) 92.8 (66.7, 98.4) 15.1 (0, NC) 39.1
Negative
binomial
Yes 6.6 (2.2, 16.4) 27.7 (0, 85.5) 95.4 (87.7, 98.4) 48.0 (0, 84.8) 37.6
Negative
binomial
No 7.2 (2.5, 17.0) 13.1 (0, 78.4) 94.0 (85.6, 97.8) 22.6 (0, 76.2) 36.1
‡CI, confidence interval (derived from the profile likelihood); §AIC, Akaike’s information criterion; NC, not calculable;
Dispersion parameter estimates for negative binomial distribution are 7.6 and 13.0 for those with and without
accounting for depletion of susceptibles.
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used for exploring various aspects of contact tracing [34-36]. In the systematic review,
a very high heterogeneity in the SIR was identified, which was likely associated with dif-
ferential settings of exposure and non-uniform designs of observational studies. Al-
though the SIR among those who undertook the prophylaxis was significantly smaller
than the control group, it appeared infeasible to explicitly estimate the effectiveness of
prophylaxis in reducing the transmission of influenza based on a simple meta-analysis
of retrospective observational studies. As a supplementary approach, we have devised a
mathematical model, applying it to a single particular outbreak in Madagascar and
yielding the estimates of the effectiveness of prophylaxis and other countermeasures. A
renewal equation model, which has attracted scientific interest in other recent applica-
tions [37], was employed. The effectiveness of prophylaxis coupled with contact tracing
was estimated as high as 92% or greater, which appeared to be robust to differential
model assumptions. This was also in good agreement with the relative reduction in me-
dian SIR by prophylaxis, calculated at 87.3%. A mathematical modelling exercise focus-
ing on a specific dataset satisfied the need to explicitly estimate the effectiveness.
There has been a published systematic review of randomized controlled trials (RCT)
on the effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis at an individual level [8]. However, the ex-
posure in the controlled trials has had to be very specific and comparable across stud-
ies, and thus, the result has not been directly applicable to a variety of practical settings
(e.g. for policymaking at a population level). In fact, there has not been a generally
accepted mathematical procedure in translating the individual estimate during a certain
contact into the likely effectiveness at a population level (e.g. in a school). This indi-
cates that the population benefit of implementing prophylaxis as part of containment
measures has remained unclear even after the RCT. In such an instance, we believe that
it is useful to estimate the effectiveness from retrospectively collected data at popula-
tion levels, even though observational study design is vulnerable to various factors in-
cluding case ascertainment and indirect impact of contact tracing on the spread of
disease. We systematically searched for all potentially available literature, although
there was only the limited available information with a difficulty in disentangling the
data-generating process. Our review identified that different studies employed different
methods of “ascertainment” and different definitions of “exposure”, not allowing us to
conduct a simple and explicit meta-analysis. On the other hand, modelling analysis
offered a robust estimate of the effectiveness of prophylaxis, demonstrating that the
contact tracing with prophylaxis yielded an apparent reduction in the risk of secondary
transmission. This finding unfortunately applies only to the specific school setting in
Madagascar, but our study adds to literature including studies among military con-
scripts in Singapore, supporting the notion that it is worth considering the containment
measure with antiviral prophylaxis.
An important data gap should be identified for future observational studies, because
an explicit statistical analysis could be made based on a well-designed observational
study [38]. The designed observational study could also satisfy other objectives includ-
ing the determination of optimal duration of prophylaxis [39]. As we discussed earlier,
one particular study setting offers the estimate that is applicable to only the same setting,
preventing us from offering a broadly applicable finding to other populations. How-
ever, considering that our modelling exercise successfully estimated the effectiveness of
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http://www.tbiomed.com/content/10/1/4antiviral prophylaxis for a particular outbreak at a school setting, and given that it is diffi-
cult to disentangle the relationship between individual effect in RCTs and its relevance to
the effectiveness at a confined setting, future study should collect the dataset in a particu-
lar confined setting with the details of exposure information (e.g. the time from exposure
to prophylaxis and the extent/density of the contact) adopting common methodolo-
gy for ascertainment and exposure across different studies. One could subsequently
employ a mathematical model to analyse the meta-data by combining different da-
tasets of an identical confined setting (e.g. meta-data of school outbreaks). As long
as we can ensure the comparability of ascertainment method and contact across dif-
ferent studies during the systematic review, the analysis of meta-data using mathemat-
ical modelling techniques could possibly yield more or less comparable and widely
applicable results. In fact, a recent modelling study analysed the meta-data of house-
hold transmission studies, estimating a key parameter that governs the transmissibility
as well as identifying the extent of heterogeneity [40]. Unfortunately, the presently
available data on chemoprophylaxis (Table 1) did not permit us to conduct a similar
model-based meta-analysis due mainly to inconsistency of the definition of contact
and shortage of information. However, future studies can systematically address the
abovementioned points by focusing on a specific confined setting such as household
or school.
Three technical limitations should be noted. First, our systematic review investigated
retrospective observational studies that did not provide us with sufficient epidemio-
logical information and sample size. Because of different outbreak settings with missing
data, we did not adhere to formal methodology of meta-analysis and, for instance, did
not account for the weight of each study based on sample size when implementing any
hypothesis testing. A more controlled analytical method with an identical exposure set-
ting and greater sample size could offer some positive important finding in the future.
Second, the outbreak in Madagascar occurred in a school setting and we applied a
homogeneously mixing model to the data. The validity of applying such an approximate
model to close contact data has yet to be assessed. An explicit validation including the
appropriateness of computing the threshold quantity is called for. Moreover, one
should remember that our modelling approach ignored asymptomatically infected indi-
viduals who could have been infectious to others. Third, the generation time was
assumed as known. Although one could try to estimate the generation time jointly with
other parameters from epidemic data, the generation time distribution of the small out-
break data should be far from the stable distribution [16] and the time-dependency in a
specific population (e.g. boarders) which is likely to form clusters is expected to be
complex [41,42].
Despite a need for improvements in a number of different methodological aspects to
explicitly assess the feasibility of antiviral prophylaxis as part of containment measure,
the present study at least identified the associated epidemiological data gaps. When an
outbreak is confined to a particular setting, we have shown that one can use the time
of illness onset and the detailed timing of interventions to estimate the effectiveness of
prophylaxis by employing a mathematical model. As long as we improve the study
designs including common methodologies of ascertainment and contact tracing, math-
ematical modelling will be a very useful tool to analyse the meta-data and answer press-
ing public health questions [43].
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The present study systematically reviewed retrospective studies that explored the effec-
tiveness of antiviral prophylaxis during the 2009 pandemic and explicitly estimated the
effectiveness by employing a mathematical model. In the systematic review, a very high
heterogeneity in the SIR was identified with I2 statistic at 71.8%. It was difficult to expli-
citly estimate the effectiveness of prophylaxis based on simple meta-analysis of retrospect-
ive observational studies. However, modelling analysis of a single outbreak successfully
yielded an estimate of the effectiveness, ranging from 92.8% to 95.4% according to differ-
ent model assumptions and likelihood functions. Future studies could fill the data gap in
retrospective observational studies including the investigation of cases and contacts and
analyse the meta-data using a mathematical model.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
HN conceived the study idea. KM and HN conducted literature review, constructed the epidemiological model and
analysed the data. KM and HN jointly drafted the manuscript. YT gave comments and advice on the earlier version of
the manuscript. All authors approved the final version of the manuscript.
Acknowledgements
HN received funding support from the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) PRESTO program and St Luke’s
Life Science Institute Research Grant for Clinical Epidemiology Research 2012. This work also received financial support
from the Harvard Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics from the National Institute of General Medical Sciences
(grant no. U54 GM088558) and the Area of Excellence Scheme of the Hong Kong University Grants Committee (Grant
no. AoE/M-12/06). The funding bodies were not involved in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data, the
writing of the manuscript or the decision to submit for publication.
Author details
1School of Public Health, The University of Hong Kong, 100 Cyberport Road, Pokfulam, Hong Kong, China.
2Department of International Health, Nagasaki University Institute of Tropical Medicine and GCOE, Sakamoto, Nagasaki,
Japan. 3PRESTO, Japan Science and Technology Agency, Kawaguchi, Saitama, Japan.
Received: 27 November 2012 Accepted: 14 January 2013
Published: 16 January 2013
References
1. Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Cauchemez S, Hanage WP, Van Kerkhove MD, Hollingsworth TD, Griffin J, Baggaley RF,
Jenkins HE, Lyons EJ, Jombart T, Hinsley WR, Grassly NC, Balloux F, Ghani AC, Ferguson NM, Rambaut A, Pybus OG,
Lopez-Gatell H, Alpuche-Aranda CM, Chapela IB, Zavala EP, Guevara DM, Checchi F, Garcia E, Hugonnet S, Roth C,
WHO Rapid Pandemic Assessment Collaboration: Pandemic potential of a strain of influenza A (H1N1): early
findings. Science 2009, 324:1557–1561.
2. Nishiura H: Case fatality ratio of pandemic influenza. Lancet Infect Dis 2010, 10:443–444.
3. Viboud C, Miller M, Olson D, Osterholm M, Simonsen L: Preliminary estimates of mortality and years of life lost
associated with the 2009 a/H1N1 pandemic in the US and comparison with past influenza seasons. PLoS Curr
2010, 2:RRN1153.
4. Wu P, Cowling BJ, Wu JT, Lau EH, Ip DK, Nishiura H: The epidemiological and public health research response
to 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1): experiences from Hong Kong. Influenza Other Respi Viruses 2012,
doi:10.1111/j.1750-2659.2012.00420.x. in press.
5. Odaira F, Takahashi H, Toyokawa T, Tsuchihashi Y, Kodama T, Yahata Y, Sunagawa T, Taniguchi K, Okabe N:
Assessment of secondary attack rate and effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis among household contacts in
an influenza A(H1N1)v outbreak in Kobe, Japan, May-June 2009. Euro Surveill 2009, 14:pii=19320.
6. Komiya N, Gu Y, Kamiya H, Yahata Y, Yasui Y, Taniguchi K, Okabe N: Household transmission of pandemic 2009
influenza A (H1N1) virus in Osaka, Japan in May 2009. J Infect 2010, 61:284–288.
7. Lau LL, Nishiura H, Kelly H, Ip DK, Leung GM, Cowling BJ: Household transmission of 2009 pandemic influenza
A (H1N1): a systematic review and meta-analysis. Epidemiology 2012, 23:531–542.
8. Khazeni N, Bravata DM, Holty JE, Uyeki TM, Stave CD, Gould MK: Systematic review: safety and efficacy of
extended-duration antiviral chemoprophylaxis against pandemic and seasonal influenza. Ann Intern Med 2009,
151:464–473.
9. Lee VJ, Yap J, Cook AR, Chen MI, Tay JK, Tan BH, Loh JP, Chew SW, Koh WH, Lin R, Cui L, Lee CW, Sung WK, Wong
CW, Hibberd ML, Kang WL, Seet B, Tambyah PA: Oseltamivir ring prophylaxis for containment of 2009 H1N1
influenza outbreaks. N Engl J Med 2010, 362:2166–2174.
10. Lee VJ, Yap J, Tay JK, Barr I, Gao Q, Ho HJ, Tan BH, Kelly PM, Tambyah PA, Kelso A, Chen MI: Seroconversion and
asymptomatic infections during oseltamivir prophylaxis against Influenza A H1N1 2009. BMC Infect Dis 2010,
10:164.
Mizumoto et al. Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2013, 10:4 Page 17 of 18
http://www.tbiomed.com/content/10/1/411. Lee VJ, Yap J, Maurer-Stroh S, Lee RT, Eisenhaber F, Tay JK, Ting PJ, Loh JP, Wong CW, Tan BH, Koay ES, Kelly PM,
Hibberd ML: Investigation of causes of oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis failures during influenza A (H1N1-2009)
outbreaks. J Clin Virol 2011, 50:104–108.
12. Moher D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, Altman DG: Preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses:
the PRISMA statement. PLoS Med 2009, 6:e1000097.
13. Rajatonirina S, Heraud JM, Randrianasolo L, Razanajatovo N, Ramandimbisoa T, Ratsitorahina M, Richard V:
Pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus outbreak among boarding school pupils in Madagascar: compliance
and adverse effects of prophylactic oseltamivir treatment. J Infect Dev Ctries 2011, 5:156–162.
14. Ejima K, Omori R, Aihara K, Nishiura H: Real-time investigation of measles epidemics with estimate of vaccine
efficacy. Int J Biol Sci 2012, 8:620–629.
15. Ejima K, Omori R, Cowling BJ, Aihara K, Nishiura H: The time required to estimate the case fatality ratio of
influenza using only the tip of an iceberg: joint estimation of the virulence and the transmission potential.
Comput Math Methods Med 2012, 2012:e978901.
16. Roberts MG, Nishiura H: Early estimation of the reproduction number in the presence of imported cases:
pandemic influenza H1N1-2009 in New Zealand. PLoS One 2011, 6:e17835.
17. Becker N: On parametric estimation for mortal branching processes. Biometrika 1974, 61:393–399.
18. Baz M, Abed Y, Papenburg J, Bouhy X, Hamelin ME, Boivin G: Emergence of oseltamivir-resistant pandemic
H1N1 virus during prophylaxis. N Engl J Med 2009, 361:2296–2297.
19. Calatayud L, Kurkela S, Neave PE, Brock A, Perkins S, Zuckerman M, Sudhanva M, Bermingham A, Ellis J, Pebody R,
Catchpole M, Heathcock R, Maguire H: Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus outbreak in a school in London, April-May
2009: an observational study. Epidemiol Infect 2010, 138:183–191.
20. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): Outbreaks of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) among
long-term-care facility residents - three states, 2009. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2010, 59:74–77.
21. Fallo AA, Contrini MM, Neyro S, López EL: Case characteristics and use of oseltamivir in children and
household contacts. Pediatr Infect Dis J 2012, 31:781–783.
22. Iioka F, Sada R, Maesako Y, Nakamura F, Ohno H: Outbreak of pandemic 2009 influenza A/H1N1 infection in the
hematology ward: fatal clinical outcome of hematopoietic stem cell transplant recipients and emergence of
the H275Y neuraminidase mutation. Int J Hematol 2012, 96:364–369.
23. France AM, Jackson M, Schrag S, Lynch M, Zimmerman C, Biggerstaff M, Hadler J: Household transmission of
2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus after a school-based outbreak in New York City, April-May 2009. J Infect Dis
2010, 201:984–992.
24. Jackson ML, France AM, Hancock K, Lu X, Veguilla V, Sun H, Liu F, Hadler J, Harcourt BH, Esposito DH, Zimmerman
CM, Katz JM, Fry AM, Schrag SJ: Serologically confirmed household transmission of 2009 pandemic influenza A
(H1N1) virus during the first pandemic wave–New York City, April-May 2009. Clin Infect Dis 2011, 53:455–462.
25. Kute V, Goplani KR, Godara SM, Shah PR, Vanikar AV, Trivedii HL: Post-exposure prophylaxis for H1N1 with
oseltamivir in renal allograft recipient–safe and effective without any immunosuppresive drug interaction.
J Assoc Physicians India 2011, 59:49–51.
26. Leung YH, Li MP, Chuang SK: A school outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection: assessment of secondary
household transmission and the protective role of oseltamivir. Epidemiol Infect 2011, 139:41–44.
27. Lisena F, Bordi L, Carletti F, Castilletti C, Ferraro F, Lalle E, Lanini S, Ruscitti LE, Fusco FM: Influenza A (H1N1) in
Rome. Italy in family: three case reports. Cases J 2009, 2:9123.
28. Maltezou HC, Drakoulis N, Siahanidou T, Karalis V, Zervaki E, Dotsikas Y, Loukas YL, Theodoridou M: Safety and
pharmacokinetics of oseltamivir for prophylaxis of neonates exposed to influenza H1N1. Pediatr Infect Dis J
2012, 31:527–529.
29. Morgan OW, Parks S, Shim T, Blevins PA, Lucas PM, Sanchez R, Walea N, Loustalot F, Duffy MR, Shim MJ, Guerra S,
Guerra F, Mills G, Verani J, Alsip B, Lindstrom S, Shu B, Emery S, Cohen AL, Menon M, Fry AM, Dawood F, Fonseca
VP, Olsen SJ: Household transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, San Antonio, Texas, USA, April-May 2009.
Emerg Infect Dis 2010, 16:631–637.
30. Pannaraj PS, Tam B, Akan D: Oseltamivir treatment and prophylaxis in a neonatal intensive care unit during a
2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak. J Perinatol 2011, 31:487–493.
31. Tsagris V, Nika A, Kyriakou D, Kapetanakis I, Harahousou E, Stripeli F, Maltezou H, Tsolia M: Influenza A/H1N1/2009
outbreak in a neonatal intensive care unit. J Hosp Infect 2012, 81:36–40.
32. van Gemert C, Hellard M, McBryde ES, Fielding J, Spelman T, Higgins N, Lester R, Vally H, Bergeri I: Intrahousehold
transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, Victoria Australia. Emerg Infect Dis 2011, 17:1599–1607.
33. Weston KM, Truman G: An influenza prophylaxis clinic in a primary school: 24 hours from notification to
protection. N S W Public Health Bull 2010, 21:16–18.
34. Moghadas SM, Bowman CS, Röst G, Fisman DN, Wu J: Post-exposure prophylaxis during pandemic outbreaks.
BMC Med 2009, 7:73.
35. Armbruster B, Brandeau ML: Contact tracing to control infectious disease: when enough is enough. Health Care
Manag Sci 2007, 10:341–355.
36. Armbruster B, Helleringer S, Kalilani-Phiri L, Mkandawire J, Kohler HP: Exploring the relative costs of
contact tracing for increasing HIV case finding in sub-Saharan countries. J Acquir Immune Defic Syndr
2011, 58:e29–e36.
37. Mahiane GS, Ouifki R, Brand H, Delva W, Welte A: A general HIV incidence inference scheme based on
likelihood of individual level data and a population renewal equation. PLoS One 2012, 7:e44377.
38. Yang Y, Longini IM, Halloran ME: Design and evaluation of prophylactic interventions using infectious disease
incidence data from close contact groups. Appl Stat 2006, 55:317–330.
39. Brookmeyer R, Johnson E, Bollinger R: Modeling the optimum duration of antibiotic prophylaxis in an anthrax
outbreak. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2003, 100:10129–10132.
40. House T, Inglis N, Ross JV, Wilson F, Suleman S, Edeghere O, Smith G, Olowokure B, Keeling MJ: Estimation of
outbreak severity and transmissibility: Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in households. BMC Med 2012, 10:117.
Mizumoto et al. Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2013, 10:4 Page 18 of 18
http://www.tbiomed.com/content/10/1/441. Nishiura H: Time variations in the generation time of an infectious disease: implications for sampling to
appropriately quantify transmission potential. Math Biosci Eng 2010, 7:851–869.
42. Oei W, Nishiura H: The relationship between tuberculosis and influenza death during the influenza (H1N1)
pandemic from 1918–19. Comput Math Methods Med 2012, 2012:124861.
43. Chowell G, Nishiura H: Toward unbiased assessment of treatment and prevention: modeling household
transmission of pandemic influenza. BMC Med 2012, 10:118.doi:10.1186/1742-4682-10-4
Cite this article as: Mizumoto et al.: Effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis coupled with contact tracing in
reducing the transmission of the influenza A (H1N1-2009): a systematic review. Theoretical Biology and Medical
Modelling 2013 10:4.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
